A philosophy-prone reader may notice that this view is not without question. To clear this issue a bit, let us take a short excursion to the philosophical problem of quantum mechanics. First of all, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is a language (mathematics) and its interpretation is about the physical meaning of the language. Indeed, the tool with which we talk about physical meaning -- language, is such an intimate part of us that we cannot tell the difference between the meanings the utterances confer and the ``empty words'' used to convey it. Unfortunately, this confusion manifests itself in quantum mechanics as well. As far as the meaning of quantum mechanics is concerned, the interpretations of quantum mechanics are not only diverse but also obscure [10], for quantum mechanics itself is in some way inconsistent and paradoxical. More specifically, the paradox is deeply buried in the coexistence of classical objects which are not subject to uncertainties, and micro-objects, with the former measuring the latter. In a way, this paradoxical coexistence manifests itself as ``a puzzle of two languages'' [11]. In quantum mechanics we need an everyday language with which we can communicate with each other unambiguously -- this is strengthened by the language of classical physics; and a formalism that can only predict the result stochastically -- this renders the ``reality'' pointed to by the symbols in the formalism inherently ambiguous.
But knowing the inconsistency of quantum mechanics is not to refute the theory, which is the most accurate theory we have. For one thing, quantum mechanics is not a theory out of nothing. In fact, quantum mechanics was developed by competent classical physicists to solve problems that are formulated classically but cannot be solved classically. In a sense, the history of quantum theory shows that even though the quantum and classical world-views are incompatible, quantum mechanics nevertheless grew out of classical physics (and paradoxically still has a foot rooted in classical mechanics). Interestingly, the ``compatibility'' and ``harmony'' is restored by demonstrating the correspondence between classical physics and quantum mechanics. That is: in the limiting case when Planck's constant approaches zero and/or the number of quanta approaches infinity, the statistical behaviors of quantum theory approach the deterministic properties of classical physics. Considering the broad phenomena which quantum mechanics can explain, it is the most ``consistent'' theory -- because the correct predictions of classical mechanics are subsumed by that of quantum mechanics.
But what will the quantum paradox tell us? Let us take a closer look from the view of scientific development. Indeed, a continuous development of our understanding of Nature is not only of pedagogical merit, it is crucial for us to understand anything in physics at all. This consists of our basic stance as naturalist scientists that Nature is a harmonious, integrated, and intelligible affair. In this sense, any sophisticated world view must have caught certain important aspects of Nature. Consider the following example: although there is inconsistency and incompatibility in quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, it is hardly imaginable that we can understand the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics without first understanding what classical velocity, acceleration, momentum, and time are. We certainly do not think of these classical concepts in terms of the limiting cases of quantum properties. The reader should notice, therefore, that the purpose of the following discussion is not advocating or refuting a certain philosophical position on science. Nor is my aim to force incompatible views together. Rather, the purpose is to present a stepping stone (boot-strapping) to understanding the content of science and identifying the problem of quantum mechanics by arguing its difficulty and probing its implication from within.
In light of this, let us start with how science is conceived in classical physics, which, I believe, is still an often taken stance by practicing physicists and scientists of other disciplines. As Heinrich Hertz put it, in science we make ourselves ``pictures'' (``Bilder'') of the fact in such a way that ``the logically necessary consequences'' (``die denknotwendigen Folgen'') of the ``picture'' agree with ``the necessary natural consequences'' (``die naturnotwendigen Folgen'') of the real object or facts. Being somewhat obsolete and incompatible with quantum mechanics, there is nevertheless a crucial merit of this view. In fact, it points out that scientific research is not merely striving steadily to improve the accuracy of the theoretic prediction of experimental results. A good scientific theory must be a theory which can explain and show the connections among phenomena.
As far as the content of this view is concerned, it works well with classical physics. But as mentioned, while it is very important to boot-strap our understanding of physics, it has to at least be modified, if not totally abandoned. As Dirac stated, perhaps for pedagogical purpose [12]:
[I]n the case of atomic phenomena, no pictures can be expected to exist in the usual sense of the word `picture' ... One may, however, extend the meaning of the word `picture' to include any way of looking at the fundamental laws which makes their self-consistency obvious.
In this sense, a picture in quantum mechanics, if there is any, can only be conceived as a picture at a higher level (looking at the laws instead of objects). In any case, while an extension of picture to the higher level may help us comprehend physics, it is, so to speak, plagued by its implicit dualist stance. But as far as a boot-strapping process is concerned, it is an adequate argument (for this moment) and offers a point which is relevant to our discussion. In fact, it points out that language must play a crucial role in quantum mechanics, for it is in language (mathematics) that the laws of quantum mechanics are formulated and it is in language that the confusion, and paradox, etc. manifest themselves. Moreover, it is in the language ``at the higher level'' that the consistency is restored. We should note, however, that this hierarchy cannot go infinitely upwards, because we need an account from within (hierarchy is always a view seen from without). This suggests that it is unlikely to have an adequate account of quantum mechanics without an adequate account of language. Interestingly, seen from within, quantum mechanics may also offer a good formalism to analyze the problem of language.
Now if language and mind is to be treated as a natural phenomenon of quantum mechanics, mysticism can be kept to a minimum, if not totally eliminated. But there is a price to pay, for such an account cannot be consistent as far as classical logical explanation is concerned. I suspect this is a characteristic of any monistic world views that include quantum mechanics. For one thing, a consistent explanation demands that the subject matter (in this case that about quantum objects) is to be objectified unambiguously and without uncertainty. This is, however, forbidden according to the Principle of Uncertainty. However, I do believe an adequate account of language can be shown and this will turn out to be both a quantum mechanical account of language and a linguistic account of quantum mechanics at the same time. This is where an analytic boot-strapping process as shown above has its merit. If this step is taken, as in the tradition of analytic philosophy, we understand that it is not important to solve the problem, but instead to offer a dissolution. This is also an important motivation of this thesis.
Observing this, one should be forewarned that this thesis can inevitably capture only one aspect of the affair -- both of physics and of linguistics. The other aspects, however, are guarded by the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics and have to remain literally unspeakable and unthinkable forever. In other words, these aspects are beyond our horizon and excluded from any discourse -- including those of the sciences. But as in the case of approaching the horizon, there remain quite a lot of issues that can be discussed. These include the naturalist intelligible account of meaning. This will be argued more deliberately in the following chapters.
Now I have come to my statement of thesis.